O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a relação entre paternalismo e Antipaternalismo no pensamento de John Stuart Mill. A intenção inicial é desativar os argumentos que procuram justificar a aceitação por parte de Mill do paternalismo moral e legal. O trabalho procurará, também, investigar a preocupação milleana com as noções de autonomia e autodesenvolvimento posicionando-se por uma leitura de Mill como um pensador que defende uma versão fraca do paternalismo. Esta investigação propõe, ainda, a interlocução com os intérpretes contemporâneos de Mill, o que permitirá avaliar o impacto de suas idéias sobre o diálogo atual em torno da liberdade e do paternalismo. 
ethic@ -Florianópolis v. 10, n. 1, p. 65 -83 Jun. 2011. affirms that the legal interdiction of these contracts, even when they are freely established, can be justified due to the fact that, from the moment of the conclusion of this sort of contract, the individual definitively abdicates from his freedom. Mill recognizes, thus, that this sort of permission can have a very wide application. And, it can be noticed that if the prevention of future restrictions of freedom of choice sufficiently justifies the intervention of the State, the field of paternalistic intervention becomes, with much effect, very vast. The principle of paternalism is a principle that justifies the intervention in the behavior of the individual with the purpose to prevent him from causing damages to himself or, in a more radical meaning, to make him act on its own behalf. This definition is vague, however, about the ways of intervention. The classification of possible methods is very wide. Somebody could, for example, try to stop a person from causing damages to himself by supplying advice and information or advice and "misinformation" 5 , manipulating its environment in a way that the harmful action becomes, if not impossible, at least difficult, or threatens with retaliation the individual that chooses to act, despite the harmful consequences. Under the light of these varieties of methods of possible interventions, it will be difficult to fully reject the principle of paternalism. Thus, when the information is impossible, as in the case of the person who crosses a bridge that is known to be dangerous, or in the case of children and Barbarians still incapable of progressing by discussing, Mill considers that the use of accurate forms of intervention becomes necessary and legitimate.
In fact, the discussion about paternalism, since Mill until nowadays, is not related to the validity or not of the same principle. Who, in fact, could reject it except those who are insensitive to the sufferings of others? Mill, particularly, and liberal, in general, never question even the There are, at least, two answers to these questions. In the first place, the intervention is only justified if it respects the autonomy of the individual's choices or, in different words, only if the concerned subjects voluntarily agree. Where the approval is effectively evidenced, predicted or hypothetical, the intervention is legitimate. When it is not, the intervention is unjustified. This requirement of assent, according to the first version is what allows accepting the principle of the paternalism of State, as well allows limiting it. According to the second version, the majority of the examples of interventions called paternalistic are not, in fact, the cases of prevention of preliminary actions to the third party. Consequently, it will not defend any paternalism. The first reply recognizes the legitimacy of the paternalism of State, but it tries, however, to reduce its reach to acceptable limits. The second takes the point of view where Mill rejects any kind of paternalism. He uses it to establish the different restrictions of freedom of individual action, to explain the exceptions, appealing to another principle than the paternalism.
In this direction, two versions of paternalism can be distinguished: a mitigated or weak paternalism -weak 6 -, and the other, radical or -strong. The first one considers that the autonomy of the individual choice must prevail, as a superior value, in every decision of intervention in the strictly individual sphere. If the authority tries to step in this private sphere, its intervention must be motivated by doubtless consideration of the immediate assent of the concerned individual. If, after stopping the accomplishment of its action (or at the same moment) the individual shows its disagreement, he recovers his whole freedom. Then the authority loses every legitimacy to continue the intervention where is engaged. For the second version, the respect of the autonomy is one of the conditions that must be considered in the examination of possible intervention.
However, if the independent action of an individual is taken as irrational, the authority has the right of the intervention. Its intervention will be motivated not by the assent of the individual, empirical subject of the intervention, but by the assent of this same subject if he were well informed and perfectly rational. This second version does not check, thus, the will and the empirical desires of each individual, but the will and the intellectually defined desires of the well informed rational individual and in general.
The Weak Paternalism Revisited
Joel Feinberg believes that the assent of the individual is necessary because it is the only way the authority may know it does not interfere with the individual's autonomy. However, we saw that Mill defines the autonomy for the choice of freedom. Consequently, even before placing the subject of knowing if the individual will assent, or not, in a way that there is intervention to modify his choice, says Feinberg, being necessary, initially, to make sure that this choice is being really free. This will let us know if it is expression of the will of its author or if he is influenced.
If the choice is independent, the intervention is, in any situation, illegitimate. If, on the other hand, it is sure that it lacks the autonomy of choice or that it is seriously affected, the intervention is legitimate.
Feinberg does not forget to define the conditions of this certainty. He shows five reducing factors of the autonomy that can justify the intervention. At first he mentions the coercion from other people. The fact that an individual is obligated by someone else (its superior at work and, in general, every person who can influence his decision). The second factor is the influence of the drug, the alcohol and every other exterior factor to the person. The third one is the depression, the strong impulses and the burning hot desires, the neurotic obsessions and, what it is more common, the simple emotional excitations, as anger, which means the factors that are born inside the person. The fourth factor is the ignorance of one or several information, decisive for the accomplishment of the choice in question and that is expressed by a bad appreciation of the consequences to follow. And, at last, the last factor is the ignorance of the circumstances in which the choice will take place, or a bad understanding of the consequences to come, being a defect or a weakness of the agent in the faculty of rationalizing about gathering the elements 7 .
Not impeditive, the assent does not justify every paternalistic intervention, but only the mediations that concern people whose autonomy is one of the five reducing factors. In practice, the interpretation of these factors being related to almost all forms of intervention becomes In fact, these paternalistic interventions are not directed absolutely against the irrationality of the act itself. They simply try to make sure that the irrationality is independent. This because before coming to a conclusion, the inquiries lack of time to influence the person and to make him abdicate the decision of committing suicide. A choice that at the same moment of the intervention, can be completely independent.
The case of the suicide can be objected, it is an easy case. Because rarely somebody resigns to life without being forced or being depressive or unconscious. The authority can, then, legitimately step in to inquire about the authenticity of the freedom of choice. This objection does not touch, in fact, the bottom of the problem. What we look for is to demonstrate that the five factors that for Feinberg do not legitimize the paternalistic intervention in the not independent choices of the individual, can justify if not all the paternalistic interventions of the independent choices, at least justifies the majority of them.
To illustrate this interpretation I consider an example. Let's assume now, that the society of Peter, built by the values of capitalist modernity, considers that his choice is irrational and even dangerous for the physical and moral health of the entrepreneur who was and that, then, decides to leave this part of the world because thinks that a man raised in the capacity of love could not choose the submission and the spiritual privation and that is unconscious, depressive or under the influence of a hypnotic power or guru evildoer. If
Peter protests, being this the sufficient to evidence that his choice is perfectly independent, all the interventions -even those that concern the really depressive individuals, ignorant or hypnotizedwill be impossible and unjustifiable.
The paternalistic intervention would be an aid in the auto-accomplishment of diverse cases in assent terms. In other words, the consequence of an intervention could be a change of the attitudes, of the kind that the assent must necessarily be gotten. The sort of intervention is, generally, very fast in the majority of the controls that the family practices on the children. Thus, the children must be forced to frequent the school, to make their duties, in the hope, in part, that this uncomfortable situation produces in its place the desire of doing freely and that are currently carried through without attraction. Also, nobody has the right to ignore the effect of the legal restrictions on the change of the popular attitudes, the force of the law to carry through its desirable and legitimate objectives. Then, the argument of the assent in its weak version is to circulate, since the current intervention is justified in the fact of a presumption of a future assent that is the main causer.
The Strong Paternalism Revisited
The other version of the argument of the assent, the strong or radical version, considers that the paternalistic intervention is only justified when it can be supported rationally that the subject would authorize if he were rational or informed enough. And, this condition is valid when it is impossible to make sure of the assent at the moment of the intervention or to predict in an unequivocal form. Gerald Dworkin is one of the defenders of this version. For him, the assent notion is "the only acceptable way to delimit the domain of legitimate paternalism" 9 .
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What must be looked for, he tells us, are "the conditions that allow to assume that the reasonable men could assent in limiting its freedom even when the interests of others were not affected" 10 . mind. The majority of us stay between these extremities. Instead of saying that the impetuses are irrational, they develop a type of inconsistent spontaneity with the deliberation and the calculation. Feinberg and Arneson would say that it is not necessary to justify the impetuous choices to hinder paternalism, and that it is necessary to simply say that the impetuosity is a personal character as any other, a right derived from the right to the autonomy that Mill, moreover, insistently demands along the chapter III of On Liberty.
The second main objection to the radical or strong version of the argument of the assent is that the fact of requiring the assent to justify the paternalistic intervention is not necessary.
Arneson thinks that the paternalistic intervention is justified by the assent, and that this can be deductible of a reasonable agent who accepts it, with what could really promote interests or help carry through the current desires because they are rational or correct them in order to place them in compliance with the rational scale of the preferences. The assent comes, consequently, from the rationality of the intervention, and the justification of the intervention is essentially established in the principle of stopping the individual from causing damages to himself. It is certainly difficult to see which force brings to the assent and adds it as first justification.
For these reasons, in these two versions, the argument of the assent does not allow to decide the liberal dilemma of paternalism. The first version excludes from the field of the paternalistic intervention the individuals that have more necessity of this protection. Besides, it is based on the prediction of a future assent of the agent; a prediction that could be too dangerous or a self-realizable prophecy. The second version, when projecting a standard objective scale with which the individual preferences will be evaluated and judged, claims a tacit consent, deduced intellectually and without relation with the concrete desires of the individuals. Moreover, the two versions attenuate the weight of the assent because what both ask for is to demonstrate that the intervention will effectively agree to prevent the individual from harm himself.
The two versions put in prominence three essential points of the debate on paternalism.
First, the most important one is that the paternalistic intervention must allow the effective impediment of the agent to cause damages to himself. Second, it is that the weak version of the argument of the assent suggests adding that it is necessary to respect the autonomy of the individual choice. In other words, it is necessary to mention the empirical desires of the individual and that the only fact that can justify the paternalistic intervention is that the evil that this intervention tries to eliminate must be considered as one evil for the author. When However, if the non-voluntary of the choice is motivated by other reasons, the forms of harder interventions become, then, recommendable and legitimate.
We would like to return now, very briefly, to the second way of approach of the liberal dilemma of the paternalistic intervention. More necessarily, to the interventions that concern harmful actions to the third party.
One of the ways of constructing this argument is as old as the essay On Liberty
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. It starts with a critic of the distinction of Mill between self-regarding and those other-regarding, at last, affirm that the self-regarding conduct is a "empty class". There is not in this argument any particular action, or certainly very few, that do not affect in a way or another, third parties (or the interests of third parties, if somebody considers that this expression is very restrictive). More clearly, even from a utilitarian point of view, there would be not a category of actions that do not affect third parties or the interests of others.
In the bottom of this argument, all the examples of paternalistic interventions can be defended in terms of protection of third parties or their interests. We will use the example of the seat belt in vehicles, example frequently used in the debate on paternalism. The argument will be formulated this way: assuming that the refusal in using the seat belt does not affect the agent and does not cause damages to others, it includes a great probability of the passenger to harm himself and to affect the interests of third parties. It can, for example, raise the price of the insurances. It would present, also, an overload for the budget of the public health, and would deprive the community as a whole of the social contribution that this individual could have brought if he had avoided his harmful choice. The compulsions use of the seat belt can be, thus, defended as a way , even when they cause "casual" damages for others 14 . This redefinition answers, certainly, to the accusation according to which the class of actions that is related to others is a "empty class".
Another objection to this solution is that most of the prices that the society pays to repair the consequences of harmful individual choices and, that some use to justify paternalism, is, in fact, in the burdens that the society voluntarily supports. If some States prohibit a solitary sailor to sail freely under the excuse that this represents a very high financial load for the maritime services of insurance, he can, for example, warn that those who are put conscientiously in danger would have to pay the costs of the insurance. Or, somebody could warn that in case of danger the insurance services would be cancelled. I am not saying that these harsh measures are praiseworthy. It seems to us, however, that the altruism feelings that possess the souls full of charity to help those that are in danger are not the sufficient to prohibit anyone to make the examination of the risks that is being exposed to.
Another way to present the argument, according to which the apparently paternalistic intervention can be rearranged under the principle of not harming third party, is elaborated by Donald Regan. For him, a person can cause damage to his "self future" and, at the moment your future self can be considered as somebody else, apparently the paternalistic intervention can be defended as impeachment of damages to others 15 . A motorcyclist that chooses to ride without the security helmet is different, according to Regan, from the motorcyclist that regrets about the dangerous consequences of its choices right after he becomes a victim of a traffic accident. In the book Mill on Liberty, C.L. Ten 16 makes a radical criticism by this thesis. If somebody must punish the "current self" under the excuse that will make a harmful choice for the "future self" is also obliged to punish the same person "because it will be attached to the current self". Besides, cerebral injuries (loss of consciousness or knowledge) do not allow damage to one "future I", they are actions that do not refer to themselves. Consequently, they are not punishable. Therefore, the very logical critical conclusion of C. L. Ten: "For when the harm caused is death or severe brain damage, the victim is the present self and not a later self. Accidents which result in these types of harm do not therefore cause harm to others, but are purely self-harming. If the wearing of seat belts and helmets reduces the number of deaths and cases of severe brain damage, then it increases the harm caused to others by reducing the number of self-harming actions. This is a surprising but inescapable implication of an appeal to the idea of harm to later selves"
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.
We do not think that the thesis of Regan will make the debate succeed, neither that there is any kind of interest in regarding the individual as multiple selves. Because, if the argument has some merit, we simply should formulate the anti-paternalistic principle and say that it stops a person to harm its "future self", not justifying the paternalistic intervention, not more than the prevention of any one against its will to cause damages to its "current self".
This second general reply to the liberal dilemma that intends to demonstrate that there is not really any apparent dilemma, then, fails. Or even better, it allows clarifying the antipaternalistic position. However, the dilemma still remains. The total acceptance of the paternalism of State would lead to intolerable interferences in the individual freedom. And, the total rejection of paternalism would imply in the rejection of an essential part of the legislation that is generally useful and acceptable, as much for the individual as for the social body.
Another way of observing the justification of the intervention must be strictly utilitarian:
the prevention of the bad. The dilemma that we cautiously will propose requires a principle from which somebody can limit the utilitarian intervention, a principle that several contemporary critics find in the argument of the assent. The alternative that we will consider is that the limits of paternalism are inherent to utilitarianism.
The first question placed is to know if there is or not a utilitarian justification to be able to legitimately forbid all the interventions that are not concerning the own agent. We said that it is difficult to see because the auto-inflicted damages must be isolated from the utilitarian calculation of the well-being. Rolf E. Sartorius tries to explain the way Mill conceives this exclusion 19 . Sartorius demonstrates that if there is a class of actions in which the majority of actions is bad and some of them are good from a utilitarian point of view, and that is difficult to correctly distinguish the good ones from the bad ones, the utilitarian would have to be justified in prohibiting all the actions of this class. Mill's position, says Sartorius, is that the legal Some conditions are inherent in all the types of utilitarian interventions, being paternalistic or not, and they are very important to be known. In the first place, the intervention must really carry through its objective. It may be justified only if it makes whatever is possible to stop the harmful action from happening. If the government must forbid cigarettes, strengthen the warning related to the harms of tobacco in the cigarette packages or forbid the advertising of tobacco, then it must establish the causal connection between the act of smoking and the consequences of lung cancer, for example, or with another damage to the human body. In the second place, all utilitarian intervention must have advantageous consequences in the utilitarian balance sheet. At least the price of the intervention should not exceed the benefit gained, the prevented damage. It is important to establish this calculation in the cases of paternalistic interventions to know the probability of damages of the individual action and the degree of risk to the agent. Equally, the consideration of the price of the intervention must lead to the preference for the advice, for the warning and information to other ways of manipulation or coercion.
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These general utilitarian limits cover, we believe, much more than the principle of the assent previously argued. There is no doubt, as long as the argument of the assent is based in the demonstration that what is in the long term is of the individual's interest, the utilitarian principle limits more, or with the same degree, the intervention than the principle of the assent.
I would like to go further and claim that there are utilitarian limits to every paternalistic intervention. Precisely, the argument is that, in a certain way, the individual knows better than anybody else his own interests, not because he is well informed of the consequences of his action, but because he is the only one to know his necessities, the order of priorities and preferences 20 .
To continue in this direction, I appeal to John Stuart Mill. He uses arguments to defend the anti-paternalistic principle that questions the efficiency, in terms of utility, of the majority of the paternalistic interventions.
(...) But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions: which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without 21 .
This citation contains two very relevant elements. The first one is that the individual is more concerned about his own interests than anybody else, and more especially than the society as a whole. If this is true and considering that the altruism is the reason of paternalism, the individuals would be the first to avoid actions with harmful consequences for themselves, and would compel others (also the State) of this mission that inevitably generates a bad use of the power.
The second element is that individuals know their own interests better than anyone else.
Consequently, if somebody accepts this affirmation, several professions must, then, disappear, like doctors or guards, for example, all those which advice is, for us, of our own concern and that somebody must, consequently, apply. In a similar way, the paternalistic interferences, even through the advice and in limited cases that Mill tolerates, would be all illegitimate ones since they are necessarily badly informed.
But, it is also clear that there is the risk of individuals acting in an unconscious way -or because they are ignorant, or because they are in a state of psychological disorder, or for another reason -and leave behind the undesired consequences. In this case, the others would be in a better
position to judge what concerns the interest of these individuals, and it is only in these cases that the intervention is legitimate. However, Mill also speaks about the goals of the judgments, and his argument seems to be very solid. This is because the individual knows better than anyone his own necessities and preferences and is the one in better position to calculate and to define interests. And if his ignorance or lack of understanding of the consequences of his action may justify the intervention, the relative ignorance from others about his goals justify, in utility terms, the interdiction of the intervention.
What is of interest to a person is related to the satisfaction of the necessities and his current preferences. Consequently, nobody can know nor define the real nature of the interests if he ignores the objectives, the necessities and the preferences of the person in question. Brian increase his chances to carry through whatever desires, not importing the nature of desire. This is because -says Barry -there is a number of general sources, with wealth as a paradigm, which will increase these chances, being possible to define the interests of the individual, without having to consult his real necessities 22 .
There are, briefly, three main objections to this thesis. First, it implies that it is no longer in the interest of the individual to deplete the resources, nor to satisfy his necessities, as long as it Somebody could try to justify the paternalistic intervention when consulting the utilitarian calculation of the advantages. To examine the example of the use of seat belt in automobiles, there could be drivers to who taking the risk exam would be the main aspect of the pleasure of driving and that, consequently, conscientiously decide not to use the seat belt. But, it can be that the majority of the drivers who do not use the seat belt act-out of ignorance, lapse of memory, or habitual not-attention to the consequences of the action. In this case, the utilitarian legislator could legitimately decide that the protection from damages for those who inadvertently omit to use the seat belt, is more important than the harmful effect of protection for those that conscientiously refuse to use do it. However, it is very important to underline, the intention of the legislator should not be to punish the conscious decisions. If this is the case, his decision will be utilitarian speaking, harm. His intention should be, preferentially -only -to correct and to protect the unconscious choices. advice are preferable, as ways, to the manipulation and the coercion. Because, by definition, the information and the advice affect the only non-voluntary choices and the paternalism of State cannot be extended to the choices conscientiously calculated or even influence them. Secondly, the particularity of the interests suggests that it is preferable, whenever it is possible, to authorize any exception to the paternalistic orientations. I particularly believe that, back to the situation of the motorcyclists (frequently used in the debate about paternalism) that they refuse to use the helmet. Here we have a group of well determined individuals that seem to make a conscious choice. They prefer to believe that they will be prejudiced than abandoning this habit. In this in case, it will be preferable, from a utilitarian point of view, that the legislator considers certain specificities and preserve them, exceptionally, from the application of the law.
The objective and the justification of paternalism must have a utilitarian character: the prevention from the bad. I suggest that the utilitarian considerations have very hard limits to the extension and the application of the paternalism of State, which I summarize in five main conditions. First, the relation between the action that is necessary to forbid and supposedly harmful consequences must be clearly demonstrated. Where there is not a necessary causal relation, the risk of harm is not enough to step in or to forbid the action. Second, the intervention must have beneficial consequences from a utilitarian point of view. It does not imply only that the price of the intervention must not exceed the damage that the harmful action may cause, but also that the consequences of the intervention must not be more harmful for the agent than the consequences of his own decision if it were carried through. Third, the harm to be prevented must be noticed as such, and even as an absolute harm by the majority of the individuals affected by this intervention. It is clearly that the considered harmful actions must be non-voluntary actions. 
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